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Abstract: This paper uses an overlapping generations model to investigate the urban
public pension in China. It examines the effects of the replacement rates and population
growth rate on the capital-labor ratio, pension benefits, consumption and utility, and finds
the optimal replacement rate. It is shown that raising the individual account benefit
replacement rate only increases the individual account benefits. Raising the social pool
benefit replacement rate induces the increase in the social pool benefits and
retirement-period consumption, while the decrease in the capital-labor ratio, individual
account benefits, working-period consumption and utility. The fall in the population
growth rate leads to the increase in the capital-labor ratio, social pool benefits, individual
account benefits, working-period consumption and utility, while the decrease in the
retirement-period consumption. The optimal social pool benefit replacement rate depends
on the individual discount factor, social discount factor, capital share of income and
population growth rate, and it decreases in the case of fallen population growth rate. It will
do more good than harm to raise the individual account benefit replacement rate, reduce
the social pool benefit replacement rate and strictly implement China’s population policy.
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1. Introduction
The publication of “The Chinese State Council Decision on Improving the Basic
Pension System for Enterprise Employees” in December 2005 implies a new round of
reform of the urban public pension system in China. The government discloses the target
replacement rate of pension benefits via the People’s Daily as follows: “The target
replacement rate before the reform was 58.5%, where the social pool benefit replacement
rate was 20% and the individual account benefit replacement rate 38.5%. The target
replacement rate after the reform is 59.2%, where the social pool benefit replacement rate
is 35% and the individual account benefit replacement rate 24.2%.”1 The government has
increased the pension benefits in recent years, and denoted to continue increasing. Hence,
it is valuable to answer the following questions: what level should be the optimal
replacement rate, what is the criterion to determine the optimal replacement rate, what are
the determinant elements, and how should the optimal replacement rate be calculated?
Some of the literature on public pension with overlapping generations (OLG) model
study pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system (e.g., Pecchenino and Pollard, 2002;
Groezen et al., 2003). Several studies analyze fully funded pension system (e.g., Abel,
1987). Some investigate both PAYG and fully funded pension systems (e.g., Altig and
Davis, 1993; Zhang et al., 2001). This paper will explore China’s partially funded public
pension system combining social pool and individual accounts. Samuelson (1975) studies
the optimum social security in a life-cycle growth model. He adjusts the capital-labor ratio
to the modified golden rule level to maximize the social welfare by controlling the social
security taxes. The approach to find the optimal social security taxes is to equate the rate
of interest to the growth rate of economy in a decentralized economy. Blanchard and
Fischer (1989) elaborate the principle of social optimum, which is the Pareto Optimum. A
social planner maximizes the social welfare by rationally allocating the social resources.
In the above literature, pensions are financed only by wage taxes. However, in most
of the countries that have public pension systems, the governments levy pension taxes on
each employee’s wage and on each enterprise’s payroll using a proportional taxation
1 See Bai (2005) for details.
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schedule. Thus in this model, as real life, the government levies pension taxes on each
worker’s wage and on each firm’s payroll; and the pension taxes are proportional taxes.
The population growth rate in China is also taken into account in this model since it
has been falling in the last three decades. This is mainly because of China’s special
population policy. In general, the government requires a couple to have not more than one
child. In some special cases, e.g., both wife and husband are one child in their respective
families before they get married, a couple of peasants with no child but a daughter, a
couple from the minority nationalities with population below one million persons, and so
on, the couples are eligible to have two or more children. There are some ways for rural
residents to become urban residents. For example, graduated college students get jobs in
urban area; military officers transfer to civilian works in urban area; urbanization makes
corresponding rural residents become urban residents; and so on.
Employing an OLG model within general equilibrium framework, this paper
investigates China’s urban public pension system. It examines the effects of the individual
account benefit replacement rate, social pool benefit replacement rate and population
growth rate on the capital-labor ratio, social pool benefits, individual account benefits,
working-period consumption, retirement-period consumption and utility. This paper also
seeks the optimal replacement rate. Under the specializations of logarithmic utility
function and Cobb-Douglas production function, we use the data such as urban population,
capital share of income and the like in China to simulate the effects of the exogenous
variables on the endogenous variables and that of the population growth rate on the
optimal social pool benefit replacement rate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model in
decentralized economy. Section 3 examines the effects of the exogenous variables. Section
4 simulates the effects in the last section. Section 5 derives the optimal social pool benefit
replacement rate and simulates the effect of the population growth rate on it. Section 6
gives the conclusions.
2. The model
A closed economy is composed of numerous individuals and firms and a government.
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The generation born at the beginning of period t is called generation t. The population
grows at the rate of 11 −= −tt NNn , where Nt is the population size of generation t.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals live for two periods: working period and retirement period. In the
working period, each individual earns wage by supplying inelastically one unit of labor,
makes pension contributions, consumes part of the incomes and saves the rest. In the
retirement period, she/he consumes the savings with accrued interest, individual account
benefits and social pool benefits.
Each individual derives utility from her/his working-period consumption tc1 and
retirement-period consumption 12 +tc . The utility is described by an additively separable
logarithmic function. Each individual maximizes her/his utility by choosing lifetime
consumption and savings, thus solves the following maximization problem:
{ } 121,, lnlnmax 121 ++=+ tttscc ccUttt θ , (1)
s.t. ( ) ttt swc −−= τ11 , (2)
( ) 11112 1 ++++ +++= ttttt PBsrc , (3)
where ( )1,0∈θ denotes the individual discount factor, τ the individual contribution
rate, tw the wage, ts the savings, 1+tr the interest rate, 1+tB the individual account
benefits, and 1+tP the social pool benefits.
The first-order condition for the utility maximization is
( ) 01 1112 =++− ++ ttt crc θ . (4)
This familiar expression implies that the utility loss from reducing one unit of
working-period consumption is equal to the utility gain from increasing ( )11 ++ tr units of
retirement-period consumption discounted by .
2.2 Firms
Firms produce homogeneous commodity in competitive markets. The production is
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described by Cobb-Douglas function αα −= 1ttt NAKY or
α
tt Aky = , where tY is the
output in period t, tK the capital stock, ( )10,∈α the capital share of income, A the
productivity, ttt NKk = the capital-labor ratio, and ty the output-labor ratio.
Firms make pension contributions at the rate of ( )1,0∈η on their payroll.
According to the product distribution, one can get ( ) tttttt NwKrNAK ηαα ++=− 11 . Firms
act competitively, renting capital to the point where the marginal product of capital is
equal to its rental rate, and hiring labor to the point where the marginal product of labor is
equal to ( ) twη+1 :
1−
=
αα tt Akr , (5)
( )
η
α α
+
−
=
1
1 t
t
Ak
w . (6)
2.3 The government
The social pool fund is paid to the retirees in the current period as PAYG pension
benefits: tttt NwNP η=−1 . Using the definition of social pool benefit replacement rate 
gives
( ) ttt wnwP ηξ +== 1 , (7)
thus
n+
=
1
ξη . (8)
The accumulation in the individual account is used to pay the individual when she retires
in the next period as funded pension benefits. Using the definition of individual account
benefit replacement rate  gives
( ) tttt wrwB τµ 111 1 +++ +== , (9)
thus
t
t
t w
w
r
1
11
+
+
⋅
+
=
µ
τ . (10)
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2.4 Dynamic Equilibrium
The savings and the individual pension contributions in period t generate the capital
stock in period t+1 (See Blanchard and Fischer, 1989 or Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 2004):
( ) 11 ++=+ ttt knws τ . (11)
A competitive equilibrium for the economy is a sequence as
{ }∞
=+++++ 01111121 ,,,,,,, ttttttttt kPBrwscc that satisfies equations (1)-(11) for all t, given the
initial condition 0k and the values of parameters  and .
Substituting equations (2), (3) and (5)-(11) into (4) gives a dynamic equilibrium
system described by the following difference equation:
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
1
11
1
1
1
1
1111 =





−
++
−
⋅++
++
−
−+− +
−
++++ t

t

tttt kAk
n

AkAk
n
Akk ξξ
αξ
α αα . (12)
Assume that there exists unique, stable and nonoscillatory equilibrium. In order to
find the stability condition, we linearize Dynamic System (12) around the steady state (k).
Some manipulation gives
( ) ( ) 01 =−+−+ kkekka tt , (13)
where
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )12112 1
1
111
1
1 −−−− +−





−
++
−
−−−
++
−+−= ααααα αθξ
α
ααθααξ
ξ
α AkkAk
n
AkAk
n
Aka ,
( ) 0
1
11 11 >
++
−
+= −− αα αξ
α
αθ Ak
n
Ake .
The assumption that the equilibrium is unique, stable and nonoscillatory is
equivalent to 10 1 <−=
−
−
< +
a
e
kk
kk
t
t
. Therefore, the stability condition is
0<+ ea .
3. Comparative Statics
 7
Totally differentiating equation (12) around the steady state gives
( ) 0=+++ jdniddkea ξ , (14)
where
( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0111
1 1
2 <+++++
−
−=
−

Akn
n
Aki ξ ,
( )
( ) ( )[ ] 011
1 1
2 <+−++
−
=
−

Ak
n
Akj ξξ if ( )11 −+< Akξ .
In general, the condition of ( )11 −+< Akξ can be satisfied because  is usually
less than 50% and θ more than 50%.
3.1 Effects of individual benefit replacement rate
Using equation (14) gives
0=
∂
∂
µ
k
.
In the steady state, the social pool benefits, individual account benefits,
working-period consumption, retirement-period consumption and utility become
( ) ααξξ Akn
nP −
++
+
= 1
1
1
, (15)
( ) ααξµ Akn
nB −
++
+
= 1
1
1
, (16)
( ) ( ) 





−−
++
+= kAk
n
nc 1
1
111 ξ , (17)
( ) ( ) 





−
++
+++= αα αξ
ξ
α Ak
n
Akknc 1
1
12 , (18)
21 lnln ccU θ+= . (19)
Obviously, raising the individual account benefit replacement rate has no effect on
the capital-labor ratio, social pool benefits, working-period consumption,
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retirement-period consumption and utility, but increases the individual account benefits.
From equation (16), one can get that raising the individual account benefit
replacement rate increases the individual account benefits. In the steady state, a rise in the
individual account benefit replacement rate implies the increase in the individual
contribution rate, further the rise in the individual pension contributions. Because the
individual savings are crowded out by one for one when the individual pension
contributions (the mandatory savings) increases, the individual account benefit
replacement rate has no effect on the capital-labor ratio, furthermore, no effect on the
social pool benefits by virtue of equation (15). Similarly, it has no effect on the
working-period consumption, retirement-period consumption and utility.
3.2 Effects of social pool benefit replacement rate
Using equation (14) gives
0<
+
−=
∂
∂
ea
ik
ξ .
Differentiating P, B, 1c , 2c and U with respect to  gives
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
0
1
111
1
111
1
11
11
212
2
2
>





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∂
∂
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−−



Ak
n
Ak
kAk
n
AkAk
nea
AknP
α
α
αθ
ξ
α
αθαα
ξ
α
ξ ,
where ( ) 0
1
111 >





−
++
−
+= kAk
n
nc ξ
α
and ( ) ( )rn α−>+ 11 have been used.
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nr > ,
( ) ( )
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Raising the social pool benefit replacement rate decreases the capital-labor ratio and
individual account benefits, increases the social pool benefits, decreases the
working-period consumption if the interest rate is higher than the population growth rate,
increases the retirement-period consumption if the interest rate is lower than the
population growth rate, decreases the utility if the interest rate is higher than the
population growth rate and vice versa.
A rise in the social pool benefit replacement rate increases the social pool benefits,
thus the savings for consumption in retirement period fall, further the capital-labor ratio
decreases. Raising the social pool benefit replacement rate directly increases the social
pool benefits, while decreases the wage, which indirectly decreases the social pool
benefits. The former dominates the later and increases the social pool benefits. The
decrease in the wage induces the fall in the individual account benefits. The
working-period consumption decreases because the effect of the fall in the wage
dominates that of capital-labor ratio if the interest rate is higher than the population
growth rate. The retirement-period consumption increases because the effect of the rises in
the social pool benefits and interest rate dominates that of the fall in the capital-labor ratio
if the interest rate is lower than the population growth rate. The utility decreases since the
working-period consumption falls when the interest rate is higher than the population
growth rate, and increases since the retirement-period consumption rises when the interest
rate is lower than the population growth rate.
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3.3 Effects of population growth rate
Using equation (14) gives
0<
+
−=
∂
∂
ea
j
n
k if ( )11 −+< Akξ .
A fall in the population growth rate increases the capital-labor ratio because of the
centralized effect in capital-labor ratio. Differentiating P and B with respect to n gives
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( )[ ]

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The signs of the two partial derivatives cannot be judged because a fall in the
population growth rate has more effects on P and B, whose directions and magnitudes are
complicated. It can be shown that the partial derivatives of 1c , 2c and U with respect to
n are more complex. The effects of the population growth rate on the five endogenous
variables depend on the values of the related parameters. Hence, we estimate the
parameters at first and then check the effects by simulating.
4. Simulations
4.1 Estimation of parameter values
According to the disclosure of the People’s Daily, the target replacement rate of
pension benefits has been adjusted from January 1, 2006. The social pool benefit
replacement rate  has been raised from 20% to 35%, and the individual account benefit
replacement rate  reduced from 38.5% to 24.2%.
Assume that the individual discount factor per year is 0.98, which is similar to that
found by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and used by Pecchenino and Utendorf (1999).
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Hence, the individual discount factor per period26 years2is θ = 0.9826.
There are several calibers for population statistics in China. Since the public pension
system in urban area is different from that in rural area, and only the former is studied in
this paper, so the caliber of “Urban Population” is selected. The population growth rate3
during the period 1978-2004 is computed at n2.148 according to the “Population and Its
Composition” in China Statistical Yearbook.
The capital share of income, , is usually to be estimated as 0.3 in developed
countries (e.g., Zhang et al., 2001; Pecchenino and Pollard, 2002; Barro and Sala-I-Martin,
2004). The labor in China is comparatively cheaper, thus the labor share of income is
lower, while the capital share of income is higher than that in developed countries. Hence,
we assume that  in China could be 0.35.
Since what we want to see here is how the endogenous variables change relatively
with the exogenous variables, the constant A can be normalized as 1. The benchmark
values of the above parameters are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Parameter benchmark values
  A   n
0.9826 0.35 1 35% 24.2% 2.148
4.2 Simulation on social pool benefit replacement rate
At first, let the social pool benefit replacement rate be 20%. Substituting the above
parameter benchmark values into equation (12) in the steady state and calculating
repeatedly until the equation holds, one can get the capital-labor ratio, k0.0161.
Substituting the estimated k and the related parameter benchmark values into equations
(15)-(19) gives the social pool benefits, individual account benefits, working-period
consumption, retirement-period consumption and utility. Then, let the social pool benefit
replacement rate be 28% (we take this rate between 20% and 35%) and 35%, respectively.
2 There are two reasons to choose a period length of 26 years in this model. One is that the length is
usually in the interval of 25-30 years in the literature on OLG model. The other is the structure of the
data in China.
3 This is equivalent to the average population growth rate per year, (1+2.148)1/26-1  4.51%. As the
literature, we also use the value per period in the text.
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Repeating the above procedure yields the result shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Effects of social pool benefit replacement rate
 20% 28% 35%
k 0.0161 0.0150 0.0142
P 0.0288 0.0384 0.0461
B 0.0348 0.0332 0.0319
c1 0.0934 0.0900 0.0873
c2 0.33876 0.33898 0.33902
U -3.0112 -3.0473 -3.0787
Raising the social pool benefit replacement rate decreases the capital-labor ratio,
increases the social pool benefits, decreases the individual account benefits and
working-period consumption, increases the retirement-period consumption, and decreases
the utility. The simulation justifies the counterpart in the comparative statics.
4.3 Simulation on population growth rate
Since the current term, 2005-2015, is more concerned, we look into the population
growth rates during the periods (26 years per period) including the current term, such as
period 1984-2010 and period 1989-2015. It is necessary to predict the urban population in
each year from 2007 to 2015. The sample is the urban population in each year from 1978
to 2006. Using the TREND function in Microsoft Excel gives the result shown in
Appendix A. The R2 value is 0.9725, which implies a very good fit. Computing the
population growth rates yields that the rate during period 1984-2010 is 1.500, and that
during period 1989-2015 is 1.272. Simulating with the estimated population growth rates
and the benchmark parameter values gives the result shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Effects of population growth rate
n 2.148 1.500 1.272
k 0.0142 0.0189 0.0212
P 0.0461 0.0498 0.0512
B 0.0319 0.0344 0.0354
c1 0.0873 0.0949 0.0980
c2 0.3390 0.3152 0.3060
U -3.0787 -3.0376 -3.0228
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The fall in the population growth rate increases the capital-labor ratio, social pool
benefits, individual account benefits, working-period consumption, decreases the
retirement-period consumption, and increases the utility.
5. The Pareto Optimum
Since the social pool benefit replacement rate, one of the policy variables, has effect
on the capital-labor ratio, it is possible to find the optimal social pool benefit replacement
rate to maximize the social welfare. The social welfare function is defined as the sum of
the lifetime utilities of all current and future generations4:
( )
∞
=
+++=
0
12120 lnlnln
i
ii
i cccW θρθ . (20)
where ( )10,∈ρ is the social discount factor, which reflects the preference of the social
planner. The resource constraint is
( ) ( )nccknAkk iiiii ++++=+ + 11 211α . (21)
The initial condition is that 0k is given.
The social planner maximizes the social welfare subject to the resource constraint
and initial condition. Appendix B gives the first-order conditions for the social welfare
maximization problem:
∗∗
=+ 21)1( ccn ρθ , (22)
( )
ρ
α
α nkA +=+ −∗ 11 1 , or
1
1
1 −∗





 −+
=
α
ρα
ρ
A
nk , (23)
where the superscript * denotes the optimal steady state values of variables. The
capital-labor ratio satisfying equation (23) is at the modified golden rule level, which
means that the social welfare reaches the maximum.
In order to maximize the social welfare of the decentralized economy in the steady
state, we control the policy variable to adjust the capital-labor ratio of the decentralized
economy in the steady state to the modified golden rule level, namely, ∗= kk .
4 Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Groezen et al. (2003) also use an analogous social welfare
function.
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Substituting equation (23) into equation (12) and arranging gives
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )ραθα
θραραθ
ρ
ξ
−+−+++
++−−+−
⋅
+
=
∗
nn
nnn
1111
11111
. (24)
The optimal social pool benefit replacement rate depends on the population growth rate n,
individual discount factor , social discount factor , and capital share of income .
To examine the effect of the population growth rate on the optimal social pool benefit
replacement rate, we differentiate ∗ξ with respective to n. It is shown that the effect is
dependent on the related parameter values, which also can be checked by simulating.
It is necessary to estimate the social discount factor at first, which indicates how
much the government weights different generations in its social welfare calculations.
Hence, it should be estimated according to the government’s regulations. Based on the
disclosure of the People’ Daily, the target replacement rate of social pool benefits is 35%,
which is the optimal social pool benefit replacement rate adopted by the government.
Substituting the related parameter benchmark values in Table 1 into equation (24) and
calculating repeatedly until the equation holds, one can get that 0.47913.
Substituting the fallen population growth rate, 1.500, and the benchmark values of 
and  and the estimated  into equation (24) gives the optimal social pool benefit
replacement rate, 21.14%. When the population growth rate falls to 1.272, simulating
analogously gives the result shown in Table 4.
Table 4 Optimal social pool benefit replacement rates
under different population growth rates
n 2.148 1.500 1.272
∗ξ 35.00% 21.14% 16.16%
The optimal social pool benefit replacement rate falls with the population growth
rate. The fall in the population growth rate increases the capital-labor ratio, further raises
the wage. When the effect of these increases dominates that of the fall in the population
growth rate, the incomes in retirement-period will rise. The social welfare maximization
needs to retain the optimal retirement-period consumption. Hence, the optimal social pool
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benefit replacement rate has to be adjusted to fall with the population growth rate.
6. Conclusions
Employing the OLG model with general equilibrium, this paper investigates the
urban public pension in China. We examine the effects of the individual account benefit
replacement rate, social pool benefit replacement rate and population growth rate on the
capital-labor ratio, social pool benefits, individual account benefits, working-period
consumption, retirement-period consumption and utility. By controlling the policy variable
to adjust the capital-labor ratio to the modified golden rule, we find the optimal social pool
benefit replacement rate. Adopting logarithmic utility function and Cobb-Douglas
production function, we use the data in China such as the urban population, capital share
of income, target replacement rates, etc., to simulate the effects of the exogenous variables
on the endogenous variables and that of the population growth rate on the optimal social
pool benefit replacement rate.
The main results are shown in Table 5. Raising the individual account benefit
replacement rate has no effect on the capital-labor ratio, social pool benefits, consumption
and utility, but increases the individual account benefits. Raising the social pool benefit
replacement rate increases the social pool benefits and retirement-period consumption,
while decreases the capital-labor ratio, individual account benefits, working-period
consumption and utility. The fall in the population growth rate increases the capital-labor
ratio, social pool benefits, individual account benefits, working-period consumption and
utility, while decreases the retirement-period consumption.
The optimal social pool benefit replacement rate depends on the population growth
rate, individual discount factor, social discount factor and capital share of income. It
decreases when the population growth rate has fallen.
Table 5 Effects of replacement rates and population growth rate
k P B c1 c2 U
  0 0 + 0 0 0
  - + - - + -
n  + + + + - +
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The above results include the following policy implications: () In order to decrease
the capital-labor ratio to restrain the over-fast growth of capital assets investment in China
in most years of the last two decades, it is necessary to raise the social pool benefit
replacement rate or properly relax the population policy. () To increase the social pool
benefits, it is necessary to raise the social pool benefit replacement rate or strictly
implement the population policy. () To increase the individual account benefits, it is
necessary to raise the individual account benefit replacement rate, or reduce the social
pool benefit replacement rate or strictly implement the population policy. () To increase
the consumption of the workers, it is necessary to reduce the social pool benefit
replacement rate or strictly implement the population policy. () To increase the
consumption of the retirees, it is necessary to raise the social pool benefit replacement rate
or properly relax the population policy. () To raise the utility level, it is necessary to
reduce the social pool benefit replacement rate or strictly implement the population policy.
The following two results strengthen the implication of reducing properly the social
pool benefit replacement rate. Firstly, raising the social pool benefit replacement rate will
increase the social pool benefits and retirement-period consumption, whereas decrease the
utility. If we define the median aim of raising the social pool benefit replacement rate as to
increase the social pool benefits and retirement-period consumption, and the ultimate aim
to increase the utility, then raising the social pool benefit replacement rate can realize the
median aim but runs counter to the ultimate aim. Secondly, the optimal social pool benefit
replacement rate should decrease rationally when the population growth rate has fallen.
This is derived from the social welfare maximization. In a word, it will do more good than
harm to raise the individual account benefit replacement rate, reduce the social pool
benefit replacement rate and strictly implement the population policy.
Appendix A
Predicted urban population in each year from 2007 to 2015 (10000 persons)
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Population 55794 57208 58621 60035 61448 62862 64276 65689 67103
 17
Appendix B
The Lagrange function for the social welfare maximization problem is
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,
where tλ is the Lagrange multiplier for the resource constraint in period t. Let the partial
derivatives of L with respect to tc1 , tc2 and 1+tk be zero:
01 =− tt
t
c λρ , (A1)
( ) 0121 =+−− nc ttt λθρ , (A2)
( ) 01)1( 111 =+++− −++ ααλλ ttt Akn . (A3)
Arranging equations (A1)-(A3) at the optimal steady state ( ∗∗∗ 21 ,, cck ) yields equations (22)
and (23).
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